Melvin E. Ingersoll And State Insurance Fund v. Richard M. Camp, Second Injury; Fund And Industrial Commission: of Utah : Brief of Plaintiffs by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
Melvin E. Ingersoll And State Insurance Fund v.
Richard M. Camp, Second Injury; Fund And
Industrial Commission: of Utah : Brief of Plaintiffs
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors. James R. Black; Attorney for PlaintiffsHarold Stephens;
Attorney for Defendant CampFrank V. Nelson; Attorney for Defendants Second Fund and
Commission
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Ingersoll v. Camp, No. 17245 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2441
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MELVIN E. INGERSOLL and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RICHARD M. CAMP, SECOND INJURY; 
FUND and INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION: 
OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS 
Case No. 17245 
WRIT OF REVIEW FROM AN ORDER 
OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
James R. Black 
BLACK & MOORE 
500 Ten West Broadway Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Harold Stephens 
320 East 3rd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant 
Camp 
Frank v. Nelson 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol Buildin9 
Salt Lake City, Utah 14114 
Attorney for Defendants . 
Second Fund and COllllll1ss~ 
>f i' ";3 1980 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MELVIN E. INGERSOLL and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RICHARD M. CAMP, SECOND INJURY: 
FUND and INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION: 
OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS 
Case No. 17245 
WRIT OF REVIEW FROM AN ORDER 
OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
James R. Black 
BLACK & MOORE 
500 Ten West Broadway Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Harold Stephens 
320 East 3rd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant 
Camp 
Frank v. Nelson 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Defendants 
Second Fund and Commission 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Nature of Case. . . . . . .. 
Disposition by the Industrial Commission. 
Relief Sought on Appeal 
Statement of Facts ... 
Argument 
THE EMPLOYER IS ONLY RESPONSIBLE 
FOR COMPE.NSATION AND MEDICAL CARE 
ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE INDUSTRIAL 
INJURY. 
Conclusion. . . . 
CASES CITED 
Interrnountain Health Care v. Ortega, 
562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977) ...• 
Interrnountain Smelting v. Anthony Capitano 
Sup. Ct. No. 16530 (March 24, 1980) .. 
McPhie v. Industrial Comrn'n 
567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977) 
White et al. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
604 P.2d 478 (Utah 1979) . 
STATUTE CITED 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-69 (1953). 
TREATISE CITED 
Larson, Workman's Compensation Law, Vol. 2, 
Section 59. 31 pp. 10 285 to 10-288 .. • . 
1 
1 
2 
2 
5 
8 
6 
6 
6 
6 
passim 
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MELVIN E. INGERSOLL and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RICHARD M. CAMP, SECOND INJURY: 
FUND and INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION: 
OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 17245 
This is a Workman's Compensation Act case dealing with a 
claim by injured employee Richard M. Camp against his employer 
Ingersoll Construction Company and its insurance carrier, The 
Utah State Insurance Fund (hereinafter plaintiffs) for injuries 
suffered in an industrial accident that happened on August 6, 
1975. (R. 3) Mr. Camp also joined the Special or Second Injury 
Fund (hereinafter defendant) as a party pursuant to §35-1-68 and 
69 U.C.A. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
On May 20, 1980, the Administrative Law Judge of the 
Industrial Commission entered an Order finding Richard M. Camp 
permanently and totally disabled, awarding him benefits from the 
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Second Injury Fund, and requiring the Second Injury Fund to 
reimburse a certain percentage of the medical and temporary 
total compensation benefits to plaintiffs pursuant to §35-1-69 
U.C.A. (R. 234-236) 
On May 29, 1980, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Review 
challenging the percentage to be reimbursed. (R. 237-238) 
That Motion for Review was denied by the Industrial Commission 
with one of the three Commissioners dissenting. (R. 240) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Order of the 
Industrial Commission denying reimbursement of 32% of the amount 
advanced to Richard M. Camp in compensation benefits for medical 
expenses and periods of temporary total disability pursuant to 
§35-1-69 U.C.A. be reversed and remanded to the Industrial 
Commission for an appropriate Order of reimbursement to be entered 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Richard M. Camp, the applicant before the Industrial Com-
mission, was injured on the job while employed by Ingersoll 
Construction Co. on August 6, 1975. At that time he fell 16 
feet from scaffolding after a brick archway on which he was 
working broke away. (R. 3, 118-122) 
Mr. Camp had a great many medical complications both physcial 
and psychiatric resulting from conditions that predated 
the industrial injury as well as those that followed the industria 
accident. These complications are not particularly important 
for this brief and therefore, will not be enumerated in detail 
herein. The ultimate medical conclusion is, however, important. 
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Dr. Jack L. Tedrow found him to be 50% physically impaired 
as a result of psychiatric difficulties with 10% of that impairment 
predating the industrial accident. (R. 89-91) Dr. Boyd 
Holbrook found him to be orthopedically suffering from a 46% 
permenent partial physical impairment as a result of his indus-
trial accident. Dr. Holbrook then used a standard table for 
combining impairments to determine that Mr. Camp's total loss 
of bodily function would be 68% with 3% pre-existing the 
industrial accident. (R. 97) 
The Industrial Commission, using the above bodily impairment 
figures as one of the factors, found Mr. Camp to be permanently 
and totally disabled. (R. 234) Some other factors in the 
record justify the conclusion of 100% disablement or unemploy-
ability are: 
1. That the applicant suffered from an unrated bilateral 
nerve palsey, peripheral neuropathy or deterioration of the 
peripheral nerves secondary to pre-existing chronic alcoholism. 
(R. 50, 89-91, 141, 155, 157) 
2. That he had already registered for rehabilitation 
training three months prior to the industrial injury and made 
unsuccessful attempts at rehabilitation training after the 
accident. (R. 61) 
3. That he had been married five times without success. 
(R. 37) 
4. That he had hurt his back before the industrial 
accident which would at times lay him up though that condition had 
not been rated. (R. 144) 
-3-
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5. That he had intestinal obstruction operative procedures 
related to drug overdoses in about 1973 that had not been 
specifically rated. (R. 147) 
6. That he had an extremely troubled childhood that 
led to his only obtaining a 4th grade education. (R. 40) 
7. That the only skill he had acquired was that of a 
journeyman bricklayer, which occupation he could no longer 
perform with his injuries. (R. 40) 
8. That he is a man nearly 50 years of age. (R. 159) 
As is obvious, a percentage of his physical impairment is 
not the result of the industrial accident and, therefore, not 
the responsibility of the employer. Furthermore, all of the 
additional factors listed above which may be termed "employ-
ability" factors are likewise not the responsibility of the 
employer and are not factually caused by Mr. Camp's employment 
with plaintiff. 
Plaintiffs did not and do not now object to the finding 
of a 100% disability. However, plaintiffs do object to 
the reimbursement from defendant of only 4% of the amounts 
already advanced for medical expenses and temporary total 
compensation. The basis for the decision by the Commission 
to limit the reimbursement to 4% is that employability factors 
are not to be considered in determining the obligation of 
the Special Fund as stated in §35-1-69 U.C.A. 
It is the position of plaintiffs that where there is a 
pre-existing condition the employer is only responsible for 
the proporation the bodily impairment from the industrial accident 
-4-
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bears to the total disability whether that disability be total 
or some lesser percentage. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EMPLOYER IS ONLY RESPONSIBLE FOR COM-
PENSATION AND MEDICAL CARE ATTRIBUTABLE 
TO THE INDUSTRIAL INJURY. 
It should be stated at this point that the argument that 
follows is nearly identical to that offered in the case of 
Northwest Carriers, Inc. et al. v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, Supreme Ct. No. 17170. From plaintiffs' view the issues 
in the two cases are the same and should be considered at the 
same time to conserve the Court's time as much as possible. For 
that purpose, a separate Motion for Consolidation is being 
filed simultaneiously with this brief. 
The Industrial Commission takes an interesting approach 
to the issue of the apportionment in a permanent and total case 
such as the one currently before this Court. However, the 
approach is in error and fails to take into account the clear 
statement of the responsibility of the employer and the employer's 
insurance carrier in §35-1-69 U.C.A. The pertinent parts are 
as follows: 
. . . compensation and medical care . • . shall 
be awarded on the basis of the combined injuries, 
but the liability of the employer for such 
compensation and medical care shall be for the 
industrial injury only and the remainder shall 
be paid out of the Special Fund . . . . 
A medical panel . . . shall review all medical 
aspects of the case . . . the Industrial Com-
mission shall then assess the liabili~y for 
-5-
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compensation and medical care to the employer 
on the basis of the percentage of permanent 
physical impairment attributable to the industrial 
injury only and the remainder shall be payable 
out of the said Special Fund . . . . (emphasis added) 
The clear and unequivocal language of §35-1-69 is to the 
effect that the employer is responsible for the industrial 
injury only. The employer is not responsible for factors that 
were not caused by the industrial injury. In the case at bar, 
the date of the applicant's birth, his education, the avail-
ability of jobs, his intelligence quotient, the pre-existing 
physical impairment, all of which contribute to his being 
found permanently and totally disabled were not caused by 
the industrial injury. In order to accomplish what the 
Industrial Commission is attempting by their order, it would 
be necessary for legislative amendment. 
The case of McPhie v. Industrial Comm'n, 567 P.2d 153 
(Utah 1977) stands for the proposition that the Second Injury 
Fund is to pay pursuant to §35-1-69 U.C.A. and §35-1-67, the 
"remainder" of whatever is left to be paid after the employer 
has discharged its liability. The case of Intermountain Health 
Care v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977); White et al. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 604 P.2d 478 (Utah 1979); and Intermountain 
Smelting v. Anthony Capitano, Sup. Ct. No. 16530 (March 24, 1980) 
have further clarified the meaning of "remainder". The employer 
is responsible only for the industrial accident, the permanent 
loss of bodily function or impairment attributable to the indus-
trial accident and the percentage share that the permanent 
partial loss of bodily function bears to the overall disability 
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suffered by the injured workman for temporary total and medical 
benefits. 
To rule otherwise would be directly in contradiction of the 
public policy which dictated the passage of the legislation 
in the first place: 
While at first glance it might appear that the 
apportionment rule favors the employer and 
nonapportionment the employee, in practice the 
nonapportionment rule proved the worse of the 
two evils from the standpoint of the handicapped 
worker. As soon as it became clear that a part-
icular state had adopted a rule requiring an 
employer to bear the full cost of total disability 
for loss of the crippled worker's disability 
for the loss of the crippled worker's remaining leg 
or arm, employers had a strong financial incentive 
to discharge all handicapped workers who might 
bring upon them this kind of aggravated liability. 
Under either rule, then, the compensation system 
operated unsatisfactorily in the case of pre-
viously impaired workers: Under apportionment 
they received far less than their actual condition 
required to prevent destitution; under nonap-
portionment they lost their jobs. Second Injury 
Funds, which have been adopted in all but four 
states, are the solution to this dilemma. The 
usual provision makes the employer ultimately 
liable only for the amount of disability at-
tributable to the particular injury occuring in 
his employment, which the Fund pays the dif-
ference between that amount and the total amount 
to which the employee is entitled for the com-
bined effects of his prior and present injury. 
(emphasis added) 
Larson, Workman's Compensation Law, Vol. 2, Section 59.31 pp. 
10-285 to 10-288. 
It is clear from the wording of §35-1-69 U.C.A., supra, 
that it is intended not only as a benefit to the employee, but 
also as a limitation to the extent of liability of an employer 
-7-
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so that the public policy stated by Prof. Larson can be sat-
isfied. The employer is not responsible for factors contri-
buting to disability other than the actual physical impairment 
caused by the industrial injury. 
Therefore, in the case at bar, plaintiffs are entitled 
to a reimbursement of 32% of the benefits for temporary total 
compensation and medical compensation advanced to Richard M. 
Camp through the years. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission of Utah acted in excess of 
its administrative powers in failing to order reimbursement 
to plaintiff of 32% of the medical and temporary total disability 
payments advanced to Richard M. Camp. The Commission erroneously 
interpreted §35-1-69 U.C.A. to mean that the employer is 
responsible for employability factors in addition to the per-
centage of physical impairment caused by the industrial 
accident. The result, contrary to §35-1-69, is that the em-
ployer is made to pay for an injured employee's age, lack of 
education, lack of intelligence, lack of job availability, 
and the fact that because of the above an employee is not 
a good candidate for vocational rehabilitation. 
The Industrial Commission shall . . . assess 
the liability for compensation and medical care 
to the employer on the basis of the percentage 
of permanent physical impairment attributable 
to the industrial injury only and the remainder 
shall be payable out of the Special Fund . . . 
(emphasis added) 
§35-1-69 U.C.A. 
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This case should be remanded to the Industrial Commission 
with instructions that an Order be entered directing the 
Special Fund reimburse plaintiffs 32% of the amounts paid 
for medical care and for temporary total compensation. 
DATED this day of September, 1980. 
BLACK & MOORE 
I 
.1 r // ·-·-
JAMBS R. BLAcf<' / , 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
507 Ten West Broadway Building 
S~lt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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